Firms are challenged to improve the effectiveness of cross-selling campaigns. In this research, we propose a customer-response model that recognizes the evolvement of customer demand for various products, the possible multi-faceted roles of cross-selling solicitations for promotion, advertising, and education, and customer heterogeneous preference for communication channels. We formulate cross-selling campaigns as solutions to a stochastic dynamic programming problem in which the firm's goal is to maximize the long-term profit of its existing customers while taking into account the development of customer demand over time and the multi-stage role of cross-selling promotion. The model yields optimal cross-selling strategies about how to introduce the right product to the right customer at the right time using the right communication channel. Applying the model to panel data with cross-selling solicitations provided by a national bank, we demonstrate that households have different preferences and responsiveness to cross-selling solicitations. Other than generating immediate sales, cross-selling solicitations also help households move faster along the financial continuum (educational role) and build up good will (advertising role). We show that the suggested cross-selling solicitations are more customized and dynamic and significantly improve over the currently adopted campaign-centric solicitations.
Introduction
Cross-selling is the practice of selling an additional product or service to an existing customer. It ranks as a top strategic priority for many industries including financial services, insurance, health care, accounting, telecommunications, airlines, and retailing. Despite the increasing investment in cross-selling programs, firms find that these million-dollar marketing campaigns are not profitable (Authers 1998; Business Wire 2000; Rosen 2004 ). The average response rate as measured by a customer purchase within three months after a cross-selling campaign is about 2 percent (Business Wire 2000; Smith 2006) . A managerial challenge is to improve the response rates of a cross-selling campaign while avoiding the targeting of customers with irrelevant messages.
Most current cross-selling campaigns are designed with this orientation: "let's find the customers who are most likely to respond." Firms begin cross-selling campaigns by setting a time schedule (e.g., mail the promotional material in one month) and then select a communication channel (e.g., phone, email, or mail) for this campaign. Analysts then develop a customer-response model with the purchase decision as a dependent variable and product ownership and customer demographics as explanatory variables. Finally, upon estimation of the customer-response model, the expected profit is computed, and firms schedule all customers with positive expected profits to receive the promotion.
If the firm has to heed a budget constraint, it will only solicit the most profitable customers. We refer to this process as campaign-oriented cross-selling.
We argue that an improved customer-centric orientation for cross-selling is: "how do we introduce the right product to the right customer at the right time using the right communication channel to ensure longterm success." Conceptually, customer demand for financial services depends upon the customer's evolving financial maturity (Kamakura, Ramaswami, and Srivastava 1991; Li, Sun, and Wilcox 2005) .
Thus, each individual customer's preferences and responsiveness to cross-selling solicitations may change over time and the marketer has to track and anticipate these changes (Netzer, Lattin, and Based on the estimated customer-response parameters, we formulate the bank's cross-selling decisions as solutions to a stochastic dynamic programming problem that maximizes customer longterm profit contribution. This proposed dynamic optimization framework allows us to integrate intra-customer heterogeneity (the evolving financial states of each customer) and long-term dynamic effects of cross-selling solicitations. It results in a sequence of solicitations that represent an integrated multi-step, multi-segment, and multi-channel cross-selling campaign process to optimize the choice and timing of these messages. We compare our results with current industry practice and several alternative cross-selling approaches that ignore intra-customer heterogeneity, disregard the cumulative effects of cross-selling, and make cross-selling decisions myopically. Comparing with current practice observed in our dataset, our proposed approach improves immediate response rate by 56 percent, long-term response rate by 149 percent, and long-term profit by 177 percent.
Cross-Selling Literature
We summarize previous academic research on cross-selling and customer lifetime value analysis in Table 1 . Existing literature focuses on developing methods to more accurately predict purchase probabilities for the next product-to-be-purchased, and is useful in supporting campaigncentric cross-selling or the next product-to-be-cross-sold. Except for Kumar et al (2008a) , none of the existing cross-selling papers use information on cross-selling solicitations and there is little known about how cross-selling solicitations affect customer purchase decisions in the long term.
Customer lifetime value (CLV) in campaign-oriented cross-selling is usually treated as another segmentation variable to differentiate profitable customers from unprofitable ones. However, Rust and Chung (2006) and Rust and Verhoef (2005) point out the problem with this approach is that the bank's intervention changes a customer's future purchase probabilities.
[Insert Table 1 About Here] Our paper contributes to the existing literature on cross-selling in the following ways. First, we directly observe the cross-selling solicitations (or promotions) made to customers in our empirical study. Hence ours is the first study that explicitly models how customers dynamically react to cross-selling solicitations and measures the effectiveness of cross-selling solicitations in the short and long runs. Second, we relax the strong assumption that customer responsiveness to solicitations is fixed over time and allows the responsiveness to solicitations to change over time. The evolving state structure allows us to investigate how effectiveness of solicitations cross-selling different products varies with customer financial states or communication channels. Third, we recognize and model the long-term effects of solicitation in the customer response model (which we refer to as the educational and advertising roles). These effects have been documented by industry reports (Rough Notes 2010) but not in the academic literature. Fourth and most importantly, we demonstrate that intra-customer heterogeneity and long-term effects of solicitations require the firm to take a longterm view and adopt a dynamic programming approach when making solicitation decisions.
Data Description
Our data is provided by a national bank that offers a complete line of retail banking services.
The data set consists of monthly account opening and transaction histories, cross-selling solicitations about the type of product promoted and the communication channels used (i.e., email or postal mail), and demographic information (compiled by a marketing research firm to which the bank subscribes) of a randomly selected sample of 4,000 households for 15 financial product groups during a total of 27 months from November 2003 through January 2006.
We group the 15 products into seven categories: checking, savings, credit cards, lending, CDs, investment, and others. 2 Therefore our purchase variable records when a specific account is 2 Checking includes various types of checking accounts; savings includes money market and savings accounts; credit cards include credit cards and bank cards; lending includes mortgage, term loans and secure credit line; CDs include time opened. Since there are multiple financial products within a category, repeat purchases are recorded as a purchase of a financial product (category). For example, a customer with an existing free checking account opens a second interest checking account. Notice that this is represented in our data as a purchase. Additionally, our analysis is at the household level that may be made up of many individuals. Repeat purchases of similar products can be purchased by or for other household members. In short, we do not distinguish between new products within a category, repeat purchases by the same individual, or new purchases by other household members. Third, it is rare that customers make more than one purchase in a category within a single month, so we focus on an indicator of purchase within the category and not the number of items purchased.
Our calibration sample consists of 2,000 randomly selected households that received a total of 12,590 solicitations and made a total of 4,948 purchases during the 27 months. We have a crosssectional validation sample with another 2,000 randomly selected households that were contacted 12,797 times and made 5,038 purchases during the same 27 months. Additionally, for cross-time validation we use the first 26 months of these 4,000 households for estimation and retain the final month for a holdout sample.
[Insert Table 2 about here]   Table 2 gives a brief description of the variables this paper uses for the whole sample. The households have average total assets of $97,243.4 as estimated by a marketing research company.
The variable COMP measures the share-of-wallet or percentage of customer assets that are allocated to other financial institutions. This variable is just an estimate by the marketing research company and is a static measure of competition from other financial institutions. We observe the number of deposits or CDs; Investment include annuity, trusts and security investments; and Other includes safe deposit box and other services. This classification follows the practice of the bank and helps us avoid estimation issues related to data scarcity. We acknowledge that this is a simplification, but it is an accepted practice (Kamakura, Ramaswami, and Srivastava 1991; Li, Sun and Wilcox 2005; Edwards and Allenby 2003) and we believe it preserves the basic structure of the problem. The exercise of aggregating both across similar products and household members are related to the data we are provided with. However, the proposed model can be applied to data without data aggregation. solicitations sent to the average household during the 27 months is 6.35. The bank deliberately avoids trying to overwhelm its customers with solicitations and limits its marketing activities to around one solicitation per quarter. The bank provides us with the profit information for each household and every account. These profit margins are calculated using full absorption accounting based upon the customer's usage of the bank's services. The average profit margin per account per month is $14.71. We also learn from bank managers that the average cross-selling solicitation costs about $0.50 and $0.05 per message for postal and email, respectively.
Customer-Response Model
We observe the set of financial products and services a household purchases and the crossselling campaign messages it receives each month. The bank needs to evaluate how the cross-selling solicitations interact with customer decision process, what are the short-term and long-term consequences of these campaign messages on household cross-buying decisions, and predict when customers will open a new account. The core of our model is a multivariate probit model that predicts whether a household will decide to open a new account in a given month ( §4.1). The covariates within the probit model reflect how the customer's decisions are influenced by crossselling efforts of the bank, as well as the household's characteristics. The parameters of this probit model depend upon a latent financial state for each customer that we estimate ( §4.2). This latent state is time dependent, and its dynamics explain how a customer's financial status can change and influence a customer's response to marketing efforts. The hierarchical specification of our model relates the probit parameters to a household's characteristics ( §4.3). To optimize consumer response to cross-selling efforts we first specify the long-term profit for a customer ( §5.1) and then show how to dynamically optimize this objective ( §5.2).
A Multivariate Probit Model of Purchase
We use an indicator variable ijt Y to represent a household's purchase decisions:
(1)
where subscript i represents the household (i =1,…I), j represents the product category (j =1,…J), and t represents the month (t=1,…T).
3
The household's latent financial state is indexed by s, which we explain later.
As the cross-selling literature shows, factors such as promotion or solicitation, the bank's efforts to maintain the relationship with the customer, available financial resources, the cost of switching to another financial institution, income, and the competition are likely to determine a household's decisions regarding the purchase of financial products (Kamakura, Ramaswami, and Srivastava 1991; Li, Sun, and Wilcox 2005) . Accordingly, we assume whether customer i purchases financial product j at time t can be explained by the following latent utility function: 
captures household i's intrinsic preference for purchasing product j in state s. We briefly describe each of our variables.
3 Treating "opening of an account" as the dependent variable follows the cross-selling literature as well as the industry practice. Most of the cross-selling campaigns solicitations are sent to customers with the goal of informing them about the existence of this product. Existing literature on cross-selling (Kamakura, Ramaswami, and Srivastava 1991; Li, Sun and Wilcox 2005; Edwards and Allenby 2003; and Knott, Hayes and Neslin 2002) all define opening of account to measure the effectiveness of cross-selling solicitations. In our data, 97% of these promotions are cross-selling for products that the customer does not own. Most of the solicitations are about the availability and benefit of the crosssold product and are not price related. Thus, the effectiveness of cross-selling campaigns is measured by responsiveness to open new accounts. We calculated correlations between solicitation and purchase, between solicitation and balance. It is shown that the correlation is weak between solicitation and balance, while the correlations are strong and significant between solicitation and opening of accounts. We estimated a simultaneous equations model with balance as the dependent variables and the impact of cross-selling solicitations is insignificant.
Instantaneous Promotional Effects of Solicitations:
The variable, ijkt Z , is the number of solicitation messages household i receives for product j using channel k during month t, where k=1 is postal mail and k=2 is email. Its product-specific coefficient
measures the immediate impact of promotional effects from a cross-selling solicitation of product j on the household's purchase probability of product j. For brevity we refer to this as the instantaneous promotional effect of crossselling solicitations, which a priori we expect to positively impact product purchase. These coefficients are the ones that most analysts of cross-selling campaigns rely on to measure the (immediate) effectiveness of their campaigns. To take into account channel differences, we also include ) ( outreach efforts. It is included to measure the possibility that households interpret the cumulative impression of the bank's cross-selling effort as its good intention to maintain a relationship with the customer or additionally as a signal of the bank's quality. We label this long-term, accumulative influence as the advertising effect of cross-selling campaigns (Little 1979; Lodish et al. 1995) . 
Household characteristics:
it TENURE refers to the number of years since the household opened its first account at the bank. It approximates customer inertia to switch to another financial institute.
it COMP is the percentage of assets not allocated to this bank, which approximates possible competition.
it INCOME is an ordinal measure of the household income for time t. These three variables control for switching cost, competition, and income effects.
Stochastic Error Structure:
is the unobservable random shock that determines the purchase of product j in state s at time t. We let vector ) (s it  represent the J random shocks and assume the unobserved part of the J utilities are correlated:
Given the error structure we impose on equation (3), our model is a canonical multivariate probit model specification, and hence the probability of the observed vector of product purchases for household i at time t in state s is given by:
where M j = (-, 0) if Y ijt = 0 and (0, ) otherwise. Y it is the observed profile (J1 vector) of binary choices of product j of household i at time t. We use an S x S matrix it M to denote the probabilities for household i to transition to another state at time t:
A Household's Financial State
Each element in the transition matrix itmn P represents household i's probability of transiting from state m at t-1 to state n at time t. Hence, 1 0   itmn P , and the row sum is one.
The diagonal elements of it M are zeroes since we do not allow same-state transitions.
Instead, we capture persistence within a state as a waiting time for the state, which is the duration a household stays in one particular state. We define W it (s) as the waiting time in state s and assume it follows a gamma distribution in a continuous time domain (Montgomery et al. 2004 ): the ratio of the shape parameter to the inverse scale parameter:
Unlike the homogeneous HMM Du and Kamakura (2006), Montgomery et al. (2004) , and follows a log-normal distribution:
, where it's mean
is a function of the household's total experience with financial products and the intensity of cross-selling campaigns: (2) contemporaneously and directly impacts a household's decision to purchase a product. However, the effect of solicitations as measured by
is indirect because it may help move households to states in which they are more receptive to future cross-selling efforts. We label this indirect effect as the educational role of cross-selling. Additionally, notice that
is product specific. The comparison of these coefficients across the products (j) shows the varying effectiveness of educational roles of solicitation cross-selling these products in each state.
Our use of "education" is meant to convey the sense that solicitations help inform customers about the depth, variety, and benefit of product offers which can meet the customer's future financial needs. Given the complexity of financial products, banks must provide information to inform their customers. Therefore, we hypothesize that these messages have an educational effect on the consumer's readiness to purchase financial products. The educational role of cross-selling is similar to the informative role of advertising (Mehta, Chen and Narasimhan 2008; Narayanan and Manchanda 2009 ) which is meant to raise awareness or knowledge of a product. However, we caution the reader that our label of "educational" is speculative on our part since we cannot explicitly measure an increase in consumers' knowledge from cross-selling messages. is a channel-specific coefficient that captures whether the educational role (if it exists) differs across communication channels. We also include its squared term to capture the possible diminishing effectiveness of the educational role when a household receives too many solicitations through channel k as in Venkatesan and Kumar (2004) and Venkatesan, Kumar and Bohling (2007) . 
Cumulative Effect of Solicitations

Initial Financial State Probabilities of Hidden Markov Model
We define the initial state probabilities of household i residing in state s for s = 1,…, S at time 0 as a vector
. The row vectors of the transition matrix and the vector of initial starting probabilities are assumed to follow a Dirichlet distribution:
where P itj denotes the j th row of the transition matrix P it , and itj  and is  refer to the hyperparameters for the transition and starting probabilities, respectively. Similar to the specification of the waiting time intensity, we assume is itj   and follow a log-normal distribution:
In order to take into account the impact of assets on a household's starting probabilities in state s, we define is  as a function of a household's total experience with financial products and the amount of financial assets at time 0. That is,
where TACCT i0 and 0 i ASSET denote the total amount of financial product categories and assets household i owns at time 0. Coefficients 1i  and 2i  measure how the number of accounts and total assets at time 0 affect the probability that a household starts in state s.
Household Heterogeneity and Estimation
The parameters of our multivariate probit model are indexed by household i to reflect the heterogeneity in response. To understand variation in these parameters across households we adopt a hierarchical Bayesian approach (Heckman 1981; Allenby and Rossi 1999) . Specifically, let
be the vector of all the parameters in Equation (2) 
We assume e i  N[0, ], where  is an M  M variance-covariance matrix.
To account for the possibility that the bank relies on endogenous information (demographics and product ownership) when generating cross-selling solicitations, we follow the approach proposed by Manchanda, Rossi, and Chintagunta (2004) . Specifically, we allow the observed cross-selling solicitation to be a function of households' response parameters for several variables such as the number of accounts, age, income, etc. To estimate our proposed model, we employ a Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) approach since the likelihood function involves high-dimensional integrals. The Appendix provides a detailed explanation of the endogeneity issue, likelihood function, normalization, identification, and estimation of our model.
Dynamic Optimization Framework
Our multivariate probit customer response model incorporates dynamic components which mean that a household's response to a cross-selling solicitation will vary depending upon its current financial state and the cumulative effect of past solicitations. For a firm to maximize their profits they must understand that solicitations may result in immediate purchases but also influence the future state of their customer, which in turn influences future responses. This results in a complex, dynamic problem that traditional, static response models cannot handle easily. A parsimonious method that we propose to obtain the answer is to treat cross-selling decisions as solutions to a stochastic dynamic optimization problem.
Specifically, we let the indicator value ijkt Z designate cross-selling solicitations, where ijkt Z denotes the number of solicitations sent to household i for product j during period t using channel k (k=1 for postal mail and k=2 for email):
1, if solicitation is sent to customer for product through channel at time 0, otherwise
In other words, the manager makes the promotion or solicitation decision about when (t) to send what product (j) to which customer (i) through which communication channel (k).
Expected Customer Long-Term Profit
The bank needs to evaluate the dynamic impact of current cross-selling solicitations on
it ijkt Z  be the expected profit earned across all financial products for household i during period t:
where Prob ( ) it s is the probability of household i being in state s during period t. Prob( | ) ijt Y s is the predicted probability of household i purchasing product j at time t conditional on being in financial state s as defined by Equation (4). r ij is the profit margin associated with each unit of balance of product j, which is assumed to be known. c k is the unit cost of a cross-selling campaign through
BAL is the expected balance household i for product j at time t the firm needs to predict when making decisions at time t. The Appendix explains the balance predictions.
Dynamic Cross-selling Campaign Decisions
The bank's objective for its cross-selling campaign is to maximize the expected discounted profits from each household over the planning horizon
5
. Suppose that the bank is interested in a planning horizon that begins in period 1  and ends in period 2  and the monthly discount rate is  , then we can compute the expected discounted profits as:
The endogenous state variables are customers' financial states and the predicted purchase probability of products. All the endogenous such as financial states and exogenous state variables thus drive the optimal allocation decision, which is also the solution to the following Bellman equation:
is the expected optimal utility beginning from time t+1. ijkt  is the error term denoting unobserved factors affecting bank's solicitation decisions (Erdem and Keane 1996; Erdem, Imai and Keane 2003; and Sun 2005) . We define
as the deterministic part of the value function in Equation (17). To compute a solution, we assume ijkt  has an i.i.d. extreme value distribution, so we obtain logit choice probabilities for making solicitation decisions ( ijkt Z ):
In order to overcome the challenge of large space, we adopt the interpolation method proposed by Keane and Wolpin (1994) and approximate values for the expected maxima at any other state points for which values are needed.
Empirical Results
Model Comparison
We compare our estimated customer response model against five benchmark models in order to investigate the contribution of latent financial states, the long-term indirect roles (educational and advertising) of cross-selling campaigns, and heterogeneous channel preferences to predict customer purchase behavior. Model A is the latent financial maturity model proposed by Li, Sun, and Wilcox (2005) , which ignores the long-term roles of cross-selling and customer's channel preference, and assumes latent financial maturity is linearly determined by household account ownership and experiences. Model B is the joint model of purchase timing and product category choice by Kumar, Venkatesan, and Reinartz (2008a) . In this model customer category purchase choice is conditional upon purchase timing while ignoring the long-term roles of cross-selling. These two benchmark models represent the most recent cross-selling models proposed in the marketing literature. Model C is our proposed model without latent financial states, long-term effects of solicitations, and heterogeneous preference for communication channels. Model D adds latent financial states to the third model. However, we do not allow either long-term effects of solicitations nor heterogeneous channel preferences. Model E adds long-term roles of advertising and education to Model D, but not heterogeneous preferences for communication channels. Model F is our proposed customer response model, which nests models C, D and E as special cases.
[Insert Table 3A and 3B about here]
To determine the number of states we estimate models with between one and four states, and report the results in Table 3A . We find that the three-state version of the proposed model F is the best-fitting model, subsequently we only report the three-state version for model F. Table 3B reports the log of the marginal density (Chib and Greenberg 1995; Kass and Raferty 1995) and the hit rates of product purchases for the six models. The overall hit-rate demonstrates how well our model can predict future customer responses. To forecast future observations we calculate NACCT at time t+1 as the sum of NACCT at t and the predicted new purchases at t, simulate the waiting time from Equation 6, and condition upon other covariates. However, all models have access to the same information to preserve comparability across the forecasts.
Since consumer purchase occur infrequently-roughly 3.1% of observations are purchases, see the sum of purchase transactions as reported in Table 2 -a naïve predictor of no purchase would be correct 96.9% of the time. (Notice that all our models do better than this naïve prediction, with performance between 97.3% and 99.5%.) To create a more challenging predictive task we report the accuracy of these predictions for purchase and non-purchase observations separately 
Parameter Estimates
Tables 4A through 4E reports the estimation results of our proposed model F.
[Insert Table 4A -E about here.] 6 We predict purchase without knowledge about if purchase has occurred or not, and then report the hit rates separately for the purchase and non-purchase observations. For our multivariate choice model we must predict both when the purchase is going to occur as well as what is going to be purchased. This is different from multinomial choice model which only concerns itself with the latter. Hence, our overall hit-rate provides a measure of performance of incidence, while the hit-rates for the purchase and non-purchase samples measure accuracy of what is purchased. Consider the poorest performing Model A which has a hit-rate of 14.1% for the purchase sample, which is marginally worse than a naïve model which would predict purchase type correctly 14.3% of the time (the 14.3% can be found by the taking the average of the relative frequency of the type of product purchased from Table 2 .) However, model A still has a superior overall hit rate of 98.5% which is substantially better than the naïve prediction of always guessing no purchase-which would only yield a 96.9% accuracy (i.e., 100% less the observed purchase frequency of 3.1%). Therefore a gain in accurately predicting when purchase occurs yields some tradeoff in accuracy of detecting what is going to be purchased.
Starting and Transition Probability Equation:
First consider the parameters of the starting probability and transition probability functions in Table 4A . We find that the probability that a household starts in a higher financial state (Equation 12) increases with more accounts or more assets deposited with the bank during the initial period, consistent with our intuition. Similarly, the estimated hyper-parameters for such states with the transition probabilities (i.e. in Equation 11) indicate that when a household switches states, it is more likely to switch to a higher state (i.e. state 2 or 3) than a lower ones (see the larger hyper-parameter estimates in higher states, p-value = .001 or 0
for state 2 and 3, respectively) 7 .
Waiting Time Equation:
In the expected-waiting-time Equation ( Comparing the product-specific coefficients on the number of solicitations, we find that solicitations that promote checking, savings, others, and credit cards in the first state, those that promote loans and CDs in the second state, and those that promote investment and loans in the third state encourage customers to stay for a shorter period and to move faster along the financialstate continuum (e.g., p-value = 0 for comparing investment coefficient with checking coefficient in the third state). This supports our contention that offering the right product is important, since checking account solicitations are helpful in shortening the customer's time in the first state. This 7 The p-values reported in this section refer to the probability of a one-side test the differences between the coefficients are different than zero. They are computed based on the empirical probability of the difference being negative from our MCMC samples, which appropriately marginalizes across the uncertainty of the parameters. The small p-values are due to the fact that the data is well able to differentiate between the financial states and large number of observations provides strong information in making the inferences. However, the sampling error in our MCMC estimates mean the pvalues have some chance of being higher than the 0 or .001 that is reported, but are clearly highly significant (<.01).
also illustrates that states are not solely determined by exogenous financial conditions (e.g., customer's age and income), but also marketing activity by the bank.
Comparing the coefficients of email and postal mail solicitations, we find that the educational role is higher (more negative, p-values = .001 for all the three states) when the bank uses email than when it uses postal mail possibly due to the rich information and interactive nature of emails (Ansari and Mela 2003). However, the positive coefficients of the squared terms of these two variables indicate that receiving too many solicitations reduce the effectiveness of the educational role of campaigns, which agrees with findings in Venkatesan and Kumar (2004) and Venkatesan, Kumar and Bohling (2007) . This result is consistent with our conjecture that too many solicitations wear out a customer's attention, thereby reducing the marginal educational role.
Therefore, our results confirm the educational role of solicitations in helping households move faster along the financial continuum when a bank solicits households on checking, savings, others, and credit cards in the first state, loans and CDs in the second state, and investments and loans in the third state. The educational role differs across communication channels and products. It is more effective when a bank uses email than when it uses postal mail. However, the educational role wears out when a bank sends too many solicitations to the same household. Interestingly, we also find that the more accounts households close, the longer they stay in the first state and shorter in the higher states (p-value = .001 or 0 for the second and third states respectively).
Purchase Equation:
The estimates of the coefficients in the purchase utility model are given in Table 4A , while the error correlation matrix is given in Table 4B . Based on the magnitude (from high to low) of the estimated product-specific intercepts, we find that households in the first financial state have an intrinsic preference for credit cards, checking and savings, followed by loans, others, CDs, and investments. In the second state, the ranking is CDs and loan products, checking, investment, others, savings, and credit cards. In the last state, the ranking is investment, checking, credit cards, others, loans, savings, and CDs (e.g., p-value = 0 for comparing investment coefficient with checking coefficient in the third state).
The coefficients of the solicitations in the current month measure the instantaneous effect of Notice that both postal mail and email solicitations are slightly more effective in higher states (i.e., the second and third states, p-value = .001 or 0 when comparing the third state to the first state for mail and email, respectively) because households in higher states may be more financially mature and may have stronger relationships with the bank, thereby engendering trust and making them more responsive to cross-selling solicitations (Kamakura, Ramaswami, and Srivastava 1991).
As expected, the positive coefficient on the mean change of financial assets increases the probability of a household opening a new account with the bank. However, the variance of change 8 In our model, the coefficients of solicitations in the purchase utility model measure the responsiveness conditional on the household is in a particular state. The reason that our model results in more significant coefficients is that by taking into account intra-customer heterogeneity or evolvement of financial states, we recognize the situations when households are not ready for a particular financial product and thus not responsive to the cross-selling solicitations. However, this cannot be captured by models ignoring the evolvement of financial states. The same coefficient is estimated to be insignificant. Indeed, most parameters in Model C (the benchmark model ignoring indirect effects of solicitations) are not significant.
of total assets in the bank decreases the purchase probability. This result may be due to the fact that the higher the mean of the balance change, the more assets are available, and a higher variance means less financial stability (Li, Sun and Wilcox 2005) . Interestingly, owning more accounts in other product categories decreases the purchase probability of the focal category in the first state but increases the purchase propensity in the second and third states. This may be due to the fact that customers in low financial state may have financial resource constraints or low commitment to the bank than those in higher states, which results in higher inter-category competition. for various financial products during each financial state. In the first state, they demonstrate a higher preference for checking, savings, and credit cards, or products that provide financial convenience, and are more likely to respond to solicitations of these products. In the second state, they prefer and are more likely to respond to solicitations selling loans and CDs, which reflect their need for financial flexibility. In the third state, they prefer and are more likely to respond to solicitations selling investment-related products. Based on the products customers are more likely to buy and their responsiveness to the cross-selling campaigns in each state, we term the three states as a convenience state, a flexibility state, and a growth state.
Household Heterogeneity: Table   4D shows a household is most likely to start in a convenience state (first state) or in a growth state (third state) with a 32 percent and 57 percent probability, respectively. We compute the average waiting-times for each state to be 9.68, 10.90, and 15.07 for s =1, 2, and 3, respectively, based upon Equation (7). Table 4E lists the transition probabilities for the HMM. Notice that households in our study tend to have a higher probability of switching to convenience state (first state). For instance, if a household is currently in the second state, the transition probability from the second to the first state is 93 percent, while it is 7 percent for switching to the third state. Also, if a household is currently in the third state, we estimate it has a 92 percent chance of switching from the third state to the first state and an 8 percent probability of switching from the third state to the second state. Our proposed customer response model is general enough to allow the possibility for customers to move freely back and forth among states. A nested version of our proposed customer response model can constrain customers to move only up from state 1 to state 3. In our applications, the results show the general trend of consumers sequentially migrate Consistent with our finding in the waiting time model, this may indicate the first state represents a quiet attrition state in which households have low financial maturity and gradually close accounts.
Financial States
In this section, we investigate how and whether customers move along a financial continuum over time. In Figure 1 , we plot the average probabilities of customers residing in the three stages against time. These probabilities are computed using a filtering approach to recover the individual's state at any given time period (Montgomery et al. 2004; Netzer, Lattin, and Srinivasan 2008) . We find customers tend to slowly move through time from the first state to the second state, and then to the third state. In other words, customers begin in a financial state in which they are more likely to look for convenience to a state in which they need financial flexibility and then to a state in which they seek riskier growth investments.
[Insert Figure 1 and Table 5 about here]
Decomposition of Long-term Solicitation Effects
Given that cross-selling solicitations have demonstrated their instantaneous, advertising, and educational roles, it is interesting to measure their relative strength. We arbitrarily pick a month (month 3) during which little cross-selling solicitation occurs and choose loans as a cross-selling solicitation example. We increase by 10 percent the frequency of households receiving loan solicitations through postal mail and randomly select the recipients. Based on the posterior estimates of the proposed customer response model, we report the probability changes of being in each of the three financial states in columns 2-4 of Table 5 . For example, an increase in loan solicitations during month 3 results in a 0.90 percent increase in being in state 2, but a decrease of -0.44 percent andup from state 1 to state 2 to state 3, with some households are estimated to go back and forth (about 5.81% of the households). Reversion from more advanced states to earlier states may be due to consumer attrition, changes in their financial status, repeat purchases for other household members, or the aggregation of product variations.
0.46 percent of states 1 and 3, respectively. We also find that there is an instantaneous increase in purchase probability of loans of 0.30 percent, which is listed in the column titled "Change of Prob of Purchasing" in Table 5 (the numbers in the table are percentages).
The educational role of cross-selling occurs through the HMM process, specifically by influencing the consumer's switching to different financial states in the future. If we ignore the probability of state changes and compute the effect of our increasing loan cross-selling then we can estimate the direct effect of cross-selling promotions separately from the educational effect on the purchase probability of loans. Our estimate of this direct effect of cross-selling on loan purchase probability is given in Table 5 ("Direct Effect"). Initially in month 4 the increase in purchase probability of loans is 0.14 percent, but by month 27 drops to 0.02 percent. Overall, this increases a household's cumulative purchase probability of loans by 1.88 percent from month 4 to month 27.
If we consider the state changes (e.g., which includes the educational role of cross-selling through its influence on the state changes of the HMM) we find there is a much larger impact on loan purchases from our hypothetical loan solicitation. Starting from the third month, we notice the probabilities of households belonging to the second state (financial flexibility state) increase, whereas those of the first state decrease (those of the third state first increase and then decrease). This means the increase in loan solicitations in month 3 speeds up household movement along the financial maturity continuum towards the flexibility state (state 2). Hence, over the course of months 3 through 27 we find a cumulative 12.72 percent increase in a consumer purchasing a loan. Among this increase, only 2 percent (= .003/.127) is due to the instantaneous promotional effect, 15 percent (= .019/.127) is due to the lasting advertising effect, and 83 percent (= (.127 -.003 -.019)/0.127) comes from an educational effect. Thus, in this example the educational role of cross-selling solicitations largely dominates the direct effects which include the instantaneous promotional and advertising effects.
Simulating Customer-Centric Cross-Selling Solicitations
Dynamic and Customized Solicitations
[Insert Figure 2A and 2B about here] On the basis of the estimated parameters, the observed history, and customer demographic variables, we simulate optimal solicitation decisions ( * ijkt Z ) using our proposed dynamic programming framework (Equations 14 through 18). We obtain a sequence of cross-selling campaign decisions ijkt Z about when (t) to send out solicitations to which households (i) in order to cross-sell which product (j) using which communication channel (k). To succinctly demonstrate how the solicitations decisions are driven by financial states, in Figure 2A , we draw the average probabilities of sending cross-selling campaigns on the J products
 against the three states. As shown in Figure 2A , our proposed cross-selling campaigns are developed according a customer's financial maturity state. For example, the probability of sending out convenience-related financial products (such as checking and saving accounts) is highest in the first state, and the probability of sending out more complex products, such as loans and CD's in the second state and investments in the third state is the highest.
Based on the findings from Figures 1 and 2A , during earlier observation periods that correspond to the earlier financial stages of an average customer in our sample, we recommend solicitations for checking and savings. During the middle observation period, our proposed solution suggests sending this customer promotions that concern CDs and lending-related financial products.
During the latter part of our observation period, the solution recommends sending out investmentrelated products. Thus, our proposed solution is dynamic in that the decisions of when and which products to send solicitations are made in accordance with the household's evolving financial maturity state.
We next use age as an example to show how the proposed solicitations are customized according to customer heterogeneity and channel preference (whom to send the solicitations and using which channel). In Figure 2B , we again take loans as an example and plot the probability of sending a solicitation, given by   T t ijkt Z T 1 * ) Pr( 1 , for this product against age. In order to demonstrate whether the customization differs across communication channels, we draw the curve for both email and postal mail channels. This snap-shot analysis allows us to show how the proposed solution is tailored to age. We show that the probabilities of sending out loan solicitations using mails to middle-aged customers (age 30-45) are higher than for other customers. This finding is consistent with our intuition that middle-aged customers are more likely to be raising families and need to borrow money to buy a house or pay for their children's education. Note that the solution suggests the solicitation channel should be customized for demographics and channel preference: they should be sent through email for younger customers and through postal mail for older customers.
Improvement of Long-term Response Rates and Profit over Alternative Frameworks
Finally, we compare the response rates of our proposed solicitation solutions with a few alternative approaches against those observed in our sample. In the first alternative framework, we follow conventional industry practices as observed in our dataset and compute the sample product ownership transition matrix (e.g., the purchase probabilities conditional on owning a particular product). This sample transition matrix approach simply makes use of the observed purchase ordering (i.e., first-order product transition matrix) from the estimation sample to predict customers' purchases. For brevity we refer to this as the campaign-centric approach.
In the second alternative framework, we estimate a logit model that is similar to existing cross-selling customer response models such as Li, Sun and Wilcox (2005) . This approach assumes the latent financial maturity is linearly determined by household account ownership and experiences.
Logit models were used to predict the response rate. Those customers with the highest expected profit are offered the campaign. Thus, the solicitation decisions are made in a myopic way.
The third alternative framework is similar to Kumar et al. (2008a) by targeting customers with the higher long-term value. Customer long-term value is calculated as the net present value of the predicted stream of future profits. This framework does not account for intra-customer heterogeneity, nor does the bank employ dynamic programming to optimize future actions.
The fourth alternative approach follows a customer response model that ignores financial maturity, intra-customer heterogeneity and long-term effects of solicitations (Model C). The optimization framework is myopic and ignores customer life time value.
The fifth and sixth alternative approaches allow the customer response model to take into account both intra-customer heterogeneity and long-term effects of solicitations (Model F). The fifth framework assumes the bank is myopic, while the sixth framework incorporates customer life time value and follows our proposed dynamic optimization framework.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
In Table 6 , we report and compare the number of mail and email solicitations sent out, the short-term and long-term response rates, total profit, and return on investment (ROI) during our observation period using the calibration sample
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. Notice that our proposed framework does not result in the highest short-term response rate. Instead, our objective is to maximize the long-term response rate-which we find to be significantly higher than all the other techniques. Our gains occur by recognizing the financial readiness of a customer and long-term effects of solicitation on customer responses. The result is a sequence of solicitation decisions that maximize long-term customer (response rate) and profit. This means some solicitations are not sent to seek an immediate response, but to help educate customers and prepare them for future solicitations. Additionally, notice that the total number of mail solicitations resulting from our dynamic optimization framework is about half of current practices as observed in the data. Hence, recognizing the customer's financial development reduces irrelevant messages.
Comparing the 5.1 percent response rate from cross-selling solicitations of the campaigncentric approach, the long-term response rate based on the proposed framework (Alternative 6) is 12.7 percent-a significant 149 percent (131 percent) improvement. ROI improves by 78.1 percent and the total profit improves by 177 percent. Similar comparison holds for the first alternative framework.
Both the immediate response rates and long-term response rates resulting from Li, Sun and
Wilcox (2005) and Kumar et al. (2008a) are improved over those observed in the sample and the first alternative. These two approaches improve over the first alternative approach because customer lifetime value (CLV) is treated as another segmentation variable to differentiate profitable customers from unprofitable ones. However, the improvement of long-term response rate, total profit and ROI are not as impressive as our proposed approach. This is because both frameworks ignore intracustomer heterogeneity and long-term effects of solicitations and treating CLV as another segmentation variable is different from our proposed dynamic programming approach.
Based on individual customer response model, the fourth alternative improves over the campaign-centric approach because it allows for individual targeting. As expected, the fifth alternative framework results in higher short-term and long-term response rates than those observed in the sample. This is because it allows the bank to follow the evolution of each household and makes a customized and dynamic solicitation schedule for each household. However, being myopic, this framework cannot be proactive in taking advantage of the long-term educational role. Thus, it results in lower long-term response rate compared to the proposed framework.
Our proposed framework (the sixth alternative) takes into account the development of customers, the educational role of solicitations in impacting future response, and seeking to maximize long-term profit. The improvement of performance dominates all the other alternative decision frameworks. Comparing the magnitudes of improvements of Alternatives 4 to 6, we find that improvement in long-term response rate and total profit are highest when dynamic decisions are made, followed by proactive decision making and customization, respectively. The improvement on ROI is highest when decisions are made in a proactive decision making, followed by dynamic decisions and customization, respectively.
Conclusions, Limitations, and Future Research Directions
Low response rates are challenging managers to improve the effectiveness of cross-selling campaigns. We believe current cross-selling focuses too much on individual campaigns and not enough on the dynamic effects inherent in a customer-centric approach. We find that cross-selling campaigns can be improved by understanding how cross-selling solicitations change customer purchase behavior and tailoring these campaigns to each customer's evolving needs and preferences in order to enhance long-term customer relationships and optimize long-term profits.
Using cross-selling campaigns and purchase history data provided by a national bank, we propose and estimate a customer-response model that recognizes latent financial maturity and preference for communication channels. Our framework allows cross-selling solicitations to influence the customer's latent financial state so that they may become more receptive to particular products in the future. Our results demonstrate that customer responses to cross-selling solicitations of different products do indeed evolve over time. In addition, cross-selling solicitations help customers by moving them in the future to a latent state when the customer prefers the cross-sold product (educational role) or building up a long-term relationship (advertising role). Decomposition of the instantaneous promotional, educational, and advertising effects of cross-selling in our study reveals that the educational effect dominates the instantaneous promotional and advertising effects.
Furthermore, we find that relative to postal mail solicitations, email solicitations are more effective at more advanced stages of customer financial maturity and are more effective at educating customers.
We show that the bank's decisions should be part of an integrated multi-step, multi-segment, and multi-channel cross-selling campaign process and show that the long-term response rate and profit of a cross-selling campaign are significantly improved over existing myopic approaches. Ours is the first study to explicitly investigate how cross-selling solicitations dynamically interact with customer purchase decisions in the short and long runs. It also establishes the importance for the bank to take a long-term view and develop a proactive sequence of campaign massages to influence the growth path of households' financial maturity.
Our dynamic programming approach serves as analytical decision-making tool for analyzing rich customer databases and deriving concrete solutions on how to target the right customer with the right product at the right time with the right channel. It also provides a computational algorithm for firms that are looking for one-on-one, interactive, and real-time marketing solutions enabled by current technology. Potentially simplified heuristics could approximate our decision rule. For example, the current practice of cross-selling financial products to customers based on a snap shot of their current demographics and product ownership approximates the customization property.
However, this simplified heuristic does not well approximate the dynamic and proactive elements of our strategy and leaves room for improvement by incorporating dynamic and proactive properties.
This research is subject to limitations and opens avenues for future research. First, our study is limited by a two-year history and lack of competition information. A sample with longer longitudinal data and more complete information on competitors' offers would expose the model to changing competitive conditions, economic cycles and interest rates, and more longitudinal variation in customer history. Second, many banks emphasize account acquisition and overlook retention of Table 3A . b. We predict purchase without knowledge about the true predictive state, and then separately report the accuracy of the predictions conditional on purchase and no-purchase occurring. Please note that we do not use the information that purchase has occurred or not occurred when making the predictions. Table 6 . Comparison of Alternative Optimization Frameworks for Cross-Selling a The confidence intervals are calculated as the 95% probability intervals of the mean of the total profits based upon the draws of our MCMC algorithm, and refer to the confidence interval of the mean of total profits and not the confidence of total profits. We also refer readers interested in the estimation procedure to Allenby and Rossi (1999), Gelfand and Smith (1990) , Liechty, Wedel, and Pieters (2003) , and Manchanda, Ansari, and Gupta (1999) .
Modeling Expected Account Balance
Given that the bank and households do not know the future balance, we simply assume that for products household i already own at time t, the expected balance (expressed in thousands of dollars) in each account is exogenously given by the following equation This equation is truncated for those observations where no accounts have been opened (e.g., balance is zero). In order to predict the potential balance for the products that a household does not yet own-which is needed for profit calculations, we predict that when an account is opened that its initial balance will be the average opening balance that all households invest in product j adjusted by the ratio between total balance of household i in the bank relative to the average total balance of all households. After this initial observation we apply equation (A6) to simulate the future balance.
The parameters in the above equations are estimated using the balance data prior to the estimation of the model. When we solve the firm's dynamic optimization problem, we treat the balance process as known and draw future balance according to its distribution. The expected future balance is randomly drawn for 100 times, and random error is integrated over the simulation. This approach follows the standard literature as in Erdem and Keane (1996) . If the household closes all the accounts in a particular product category, in the simulations, we set the expected balance for the product category to zero.
We estimate the balance equation independent of the household response model. In Table  A2 , we report the estimation results of the expected balance. We estimate that past balance significantly increases balance in the current period, which demonstrates positive state dependence. Frequency or number of transactions decreases account balance. This finding may be due to the customer moving funds among different accounts. As expected, competition (e.g., percentage of assets at the competitor's bank) reduces the account balance at the focal bank. Customer tenure with the bank and cumulative cross-selling solicitations tend to have an insignificant impact on account balance. Table A3 give the estimation results of the heterogeneity equation. Household demographics clearly do not have a significant impact on customer's response parameters. Only one exception exists: male customers tend to have higher state dependence on the account balance (i.e., there is a significant positive impact of gender on the term associated with the lag of the account balance). 
